cobrowsing-redis-module@35.4.7
Malicious code in cobrowsing-redis-module (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package downloads a platform-specific second-stage binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe, with a DNS-TXT fallback channel via the domains sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, and net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the temp dir on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe start /b. The package otherwise exposes only a stub class and contains a large decoy telemetry module.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 07:25 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 07:25 PM
Related advisories
- cobrowsing-test-utils@35.3.4
- constructor-blocks-common@35.5.6
- constructor-blocks-landings@35.5.7
- constructor-blocks-mailings@35.5.7
- constructor-blocks-renderer-landings@35.2.5
- constructor-blocks-renderer-mailings@35.3.3
- contract-contract-builder@35.5.2
- csc-csc-core@35.8.6
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.