delivery-ci-upgrade-form@35.5.9
Malicious code in delivery-ci-upgrade-form (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package loads a bundled _runtime.js which fingerprints the OS/architecture and downloads a second-stage binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev) over HTTPS from paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe. If HTTPS fails it falls back to a DNS-TXT chunked transfer from *.dl[.]wel1[.]ru (c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under %TEMP% on Windows), chmod 0755, and executed detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c, so it outlives the parent process. The package's declared purpose (reusable CI upgrade form components) is unrelated to this behaviour.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:30 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:42 PM
Related advisories
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- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-mobile-application@35.9.2
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-navigation@35.9.3
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.