dolyame-ui-grid@35.7.4
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-grid (npm)
Analysis
On load, the package downloads and executes a second-stage binary. It fingerprints the OS/architecture, then fetches a platform-specific payload over HTTPS from oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe. If those fail it retrieves the payload via chunked base64 DNS TXT queries against c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (fallback domains sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in %TEMP% on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe start /b. A stamp file at /tmp/.analytics_state throttles repeat downloads.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:48 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:38 PM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.